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THE CASE OF DENTISTRY
ABSTRACT
The effect of licensing as a mechanism to control entry into occupations has been a
neglected area of both regulation and labor market research. This study examines the role of
occupational licensing for entry into dentistry, an occupation with standards that vary by state.
Our research first closely replicates Freeman's previous work on labor market cobwebs by
employing national data to examine purely market phenomena in the determination of training
for the dental profession. We subsequently approximate the government barrier to practice in
the profession by adding a weighted average state examination pass rate to the previous
model. Next, we employ pooled cross-section time series analysis to explore market
determinants of professional entry with state level data. Finally, these results are
supplemented by measures of statutory and pass rate entry restrictiveness. Our most
consistent evidence suggests that a higher state licensing failure rate deters entry into dental
practice.
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The growth of occupational licensure from approximately 3% of the labor force in
1950 to almost 18% in 1989 has been among the most dramatic changes in labor market
regulation (Kleiner, 1990). Yet the impact of this institutional change on the labor
market response of individuals affected by licensing, beyond wage changes and mobility,
has received relatively little recent attention by economists (Rottenberg, 1981; Kleiner
and Petree, 1988). This paper analyzes occupational entry in the labor market for the
professional services of dentists. Unlike medical doctors, dentists must pass a separate
licensing examination specific to the jurisdiction in which they wish to practice. This
paper will examine the way in which licensure interacts with other variables to affect the
supply of dentists both nationally and state-by-state.
The cobweb model, which has been adapted to the labor market by Richard
Freeman, is the best-known approach to evaluating responsiveness of entrants to
professional training (1975(a), 1975(b), 1976). The underlying rationale for the cobweb
model is that future labor market conditions are so difficult for an individual to forecast
that entry decisions are made on the basis of present conditions. The supply response to
temporarily high earnings draws people into training for a certain line of work. These
entrants, in turn, depress earnings and lower the number of entrants in subsequent
periods. Just as in the classic agriculture cycle, supply lags generate cobweb responses.1
Bothlogic and evidence support stable cobweb adjustments (for a discussion, see Freeman,1971:16-32).In his research in the 1970's, Freeman used these models to study lawyers,
physicists and college graduates.2 He was always careful to acknowledge both the
theoretical and empirical limitations of this approach. In recent years, other models have
rejected the assumption that supply responsiveness to immediate economic prospects
provides the best possible methodolo' (Siow, 1984; Zarkin, 1985; and Orazem and
Mattila, 1991). In particular, future demand conditions modelled through a rational
expectations approach might improve upon a cobweb analysis. For example, Zarkin
argues that rational expectations results obtained for primary and secondary school
teachers may be particularly appropriate because future demand is so easily forecast by
using straightforward demographic techniques. In the case of dentistry, however, many
contrary forces have affected demand in recent decades (see Kudrle and Meskin, 1983),
andforecastingthe future demand for dental services, either at the state or national
level, could present considerable difficulty for a potential practitioner of dentistry.3
Moreover, a rational expectations analysis at the state level would be precluded due to
data limitations. Instead, we begin with the familiar cobweb approach and modify it to
take into account the fact that dentistry is a heavily regulated occupation.
This paper has two major parts and several subsections. First, it closely replicates
the earlier cobweb models to make them appropriate for entering and graduating dental
2Inthis model career decisions are madesuch as tomaximizethefunctional form:
MaxU(X1, w1+ W)
whereU is an indirect utility function. X1 is the job characteristic vector of occuptton i, w is lifetime
carnings in job i, andWis non-wage income (Freeman. 1971:3).
The key determinants of dental demand over the past fifty years or so havebeenincome, education.
technological change(e.g.,orthodontica), tastes (e.g., personal hygiene), and public policy (i.e..fluoridation).
Thus, models that may beapplicablefor teachers would be much more problematic for this occupation.school studentsat the national level. The model is then expanded to include a weighted
average pass rate as an index of the additional difficulty of becoming a dentist once
dental school has been completed. The next section of the paper explicitly recognizes
the state level elements of the labor market by including subnational measures of
economic conditions and licensing.
THE MODEL AND DATA
In this section of the paper we present the basic cobweb model and develop the
rationale for our modifications to it. Freeman's initial exploration of the market for
lawyers ignores that the practice of law is also a regulated profession whose port of
entry' is guarded by the states. Formally, his work therefore suffers from omitted
variable bias, which could push the coefficients upward and spuriously increase the
statistical significance obtained from variables in the model. More than the law, dentistry
presents a strong a orion case that varying licensing restrictiveness could affect the choice
of profession. Most jurisdictions give a dental exam no more than twice a year and
sometimes only once. Hence, the cost of failing a dental examination and not being
allowed to practice for six months or a year would be substantial. Moreover, we expect
that variations in the difficulty in passing the exam will affect the flow of dentists into
dental practices in various states.
The model we propose amends earlier work on occupational entry by adding a set
of variables to capture various dimensions of occupational restrictiveness and their
severity, thus reducing one source of potential omitted variable bias. The three major
elements of restrictiveness we examined were: the pass rate on state licensing exams,
whether or not the state had a citizenship requirement for practice (a dummy variable),
3and the number of years since there was a major change in the state's dental practice act.
The first variable is both the most obvious and the most difficult to deal with. Put
most simply, an 80 percent pass rate in California and in Wyoming may not be measuring
the same thing. Hence, cross-sectional or pooled data analysis of the kind we employ
may be incorrectly specified unless that problem is addressed with a selectivity bias
correction (Murnane, Olson and Newstad, 1985). Citizenship is a rather blunt but
obvious restriction, and stability of the states' Dental Practice Act suggests a less risky
professional environment.
The cobweb model as specified by Freeman for a cohort entering professional
training, revised to include licensing restrictions, can be written as:
1)ENT(0) =a1ASAL(0)-a4ASAL(0)-a3RES(0) + (1-).) ENT(-1)+€1
Where:
ENT is first year enrollees.
SAL is starting salaries in the dentist profession
ASAL is an index of starting salaries in alternative occupations
RES is a measure of restrictiveness
is the time period
The model shows supply adjusting only partially to changed conditions with the
speed of adjustment determined by A.
For completion of training, the equation would be written as:
2)GRAD(t) =b1[SAL(t-n+1)+ .. . SAL(t-1)1-b[ASAL(t-n+1)+ .
ASAL(t-1)]-b3[RES(t-n+1)+ ...RES(t-1)]+b3ENT(t-n) ÷ 62
4V/here n=years of professional training
The second equation explicitly recognizes that a person's completion of training
will depend on conditions prevailing during the training period. Most of the data on
current and future dentists comes from the American Dental Association. Its Survey of
Dental Education, published annually, provides high-quality data gathered from the
nation's approximately 70 dental schools. The data show the home addresses of all
dental students with the information for all first year dental students shown separately.
These data, of course, do not directly tell us about where a person ultimately intends to
practice and hence where changes in state conditions --salaries,opportunity cost, or
restrictiveness --shouldprovide foci of concern for persons entering the profession.
In the data analysis that follows in which first year data are employed, it is
assumed that each student is gearing decisions to the conditions in the state of declared
residence during the first year of dental school. It could be argued that even if the
student does not ultimately plan to practice in the home state, conditions in that State
would be most influential in forming opinions about the general situation in dentistry.
Because it is overwhelmingly likely that new dentists are concerned at least somewhat
with the conditions elsewhere, we also include in our state level estimating equations
measures of national remuneration from dentistry, the national opportunity cost of dental
practice, and average national pass rate.
We have a completely separate set of data, also from the ADA, that provides the
addresses for all new dentists (i.e., licensed or not). In the analysis employing these data
we make virtually the opposite assumption from the previous case. Instead of assuming
that a future dentist from Iowa, who is attending dental school in Minnesota, intends to
5return to Iowa and hence views conditions in Iowa as determinative of the relevant
market conditions for future dentists, we assume that the state in which the dentist
actually first practices is the one that was the object of major attention during all of the
previous years. The use of two separately gathered data sets serves as a check on the
potential biases of using each data base separately.
In the national model, we can replicate the initial occupational entrance approach
advanced by Freeman into professional training and graduation by simply adding an
additional variable for licensing stringency: the weighted average pass rate.4 In the state
evel analysis, the model is necessarily more complicated because of the options provided
for dental practice and other employment in fifty different jurisdictions. Moreover, our
data sets do not permit the examination of state-assigned cohorts as they proceed
through dental school. Hence, equation (2) cannot be directly replicated. The basic
partial adjustment model for the pooled cross-section time series investigation is:
3)ENT(O) a11ASALO) -a,XASAL1(O)-(1-X)ENT1(-1)+ XRES(O)
+ a3?.SAL(O) -a4ASAL(O)+ a5XRES(O)
where i indicates the state under consideration and the urisubscripted variables
indicate national conditions. The alternative data set requires only a slight modification.
NEW(4) is substituted for ENT(O) as the dependent variable and NEW1(3) replaces
ENT(-l) on the right hand side, where NEW are new dentists in the state. Also, due to
Given the nature ol these statutory data, the aggregation to the national level would likely lead to
muddled results. Furthermore, the variables for restrictiveness variables, citizenship requirements and stability
in state dental practice act.s were insignificant in the individual state regressions and were not employed in the
national regressions.
6state level data limitations on ASAL, it is the average per capita earnings of persons in
the state rather than beginning salaries.
ESTIMATES FROM THE MODEL
In this section of the paper we estimate alternative specifications of a cobweb
model of labor supply for dentists when licensing restrictions are taken into account. We
provide basic tabulations from the data in Table 1. In Table 2 estimates showing the
results of a national cobweb model that uses time series estimates of licensing pass rates
as a variable are provided. Table 3 presents estimates of state level cobweb models in
order to test for the robustness of the results at the subnational level. In Table 4 results
are shown for a state-level cobweb model that accounts for alternative types of state
licensing provisions and pass rates.
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations for the labor market and
licensing variables we use to estimate the national and state cobweb models. These data
show considerable variation in the various labor market variables. There is, for example,
over a $9,156 standard deviation in constant dollar dental incomes, and also a $1,908
standard deviation in earnings of new college graduates over the time period 1960 to
1984. Additionally, the three major occupational licensing variables: pass rates,
citizenship, and years since the statute was changed, show considerable variation over
time and across states. There is also considerable change in the number of dental
enrollees and graduates during the different time periods we analyzed. Since we were
able to obtain licensing information and complete labor market data for only the 30 most
populous states, our analysis is somewhat limited. These states, however, account for
over 90 percent of all dentists in the U.S. with no a priori reason to suggest different
7labor market responses for the remaining dentists. An examination of data from these
states suggest that there is variation in regulatory restrictiveness and that these variables
have the potential to influence the labor market responses of individuals choosing where
to practice.
In Table 2 we report a national cobweb model of the labor market for dentists,
similar to ones estimated by Freeman for lawyers (Freeman, 1975). The results shown
for both enrollees and new dentists imply that the basic cobweb model is reasonably
robust in explaining variations in new enrollees and in new dentists even when varying
specifications of lagged values are used.5 In columns five and six we replicate Freeman's
lagged adjustment model for dentists shown in our equation (2), which include average
salaries for the total period of professional education (Freeman, 1975). In columns four
and five we anticipate the model used for data availability reasons in the state-level
results that follow. Instead of lagged enrollments, as an explanatory variable we employ
lagged new dentists.
Columns two, four and six show the estimates of the model when occupational
licensing provisions are taken into account. We use the yearly national pass rate as our
measure of licensing over time since we can directly estimate the potential costs to
individuals who fail the state level exam.6 Our results show that occupational licensing
The choice of appropriate lags vary since some dental school requirementa vary from threetotour
years. Therefore, we used both three andfouryear lags in our estimation procedure for national andState
estimates to test for sensitivity and found consistent results. Models with three-year lags are shown;
estimates with tour year lags are available from the authors.
6 The estimated cost to individuals who fail the exam was approximately $35,000 in 1984. This estimate
waa derived by assuming that the individual becomes a licensed dentist by passing the exam the next time tt
is given, which is about every six to twelve months, and the individual works as a dental assistant during the
intervening period. The estimate includes lost earnings growth of about one percent for the next five years
due to lost experience and normal earnings growth (Polachek, 1981).
8as proaed by pass rates are always positive and usually significant in influencing new
enrollees and the number of dental graduates at the national level. However, since
dental licensing is a state-by-state-process, it may be difficult to fully capture the
differences in "national" dental licensing statutes and administrative procedures.7
National estimates of the impact of licensing pass rates provide evidence of the
impact of regulation on occupational choice, but they fail to capture licensing as a state
by state process. The decision to enter an occupation within a particular jurisdiction is
influenced by state economic conditions as well as the licensing practices that exist in that
state. Therefore, to model the potential impact of state policies on occupational choice
and entry more accurately we estimated occupational choice and entry cobweb models at
the state level.
The results of the partial adjustment model are shown in Table 3 for both dental
enrollees and new dentists. The model's specification is consistent with the basic cobweb
model, but we expanded it to allow pooling of time-series and cross-section data as well
as having the national dental and state labor market variables as controls.8 More
specifically, we control for the year, state-specific fixed effects and endogenous variables
that are part of the basic model. We also estimate the model with a Newey and West
covariance matrix which corrects for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in pooled
We also estimate all our results as a quadratic (unction with pass rates andpassratessquared and
find little change in our basic results.However, the use ofthe quadratic formula produces a significant
coefficientvalue of .56(ordentists, whilethevalues (or enrollees are not statistically significant.
We also estimate the model employing deviations from national trends. Estimates using a deviation from
the national average approach produced the same qualitative results as in Tables 3 and 4.
9time-series analysis (Newey and West, 1987). These sensitivity tests show that our
results arc robust across data sets and econometric specifications.
The estimates at the state level are generally as robust as the national estimates.
For example, salary estimates for dentists are significant and positive for enrollees.
Further, measures of opportunity costs or earnings of individuals in the state are
significant and negative as hypothesized. Collinearity between state and national dental
incomes and estimated opportunity costs quite understandably render the discovery of
state specific effects more problematic. Table 3 reports results with the national
variables both omitted and included. For new dentists, the national labor market
variables seem to dominate the state level ones in choosing the occupation. Overall
these results strongly corroborate the general appropriateness of the cobweb approach
while confirming the importance of state level variables including licensing restrictiveness.
The results of a similar model expanded to include measures of occupational
licensing statutes and pass rates along with a selectivity adjustment variable are presented
in Table 4. First, the coefficients for dental salaries in the state remain as hypothesized
and are generally significant. Second, the most important licensing variable is the pass
rate. The coefficients for citizenship and the time since the statute was changed, in
columns three and six, are not different from zero and are consistent with prior
studies.'° Further, the introduction of a selectivity adjustment for the number of
persons taking the exam in the State does not change the basic finding of the impact of
Estimates withoutNewey-West corrections show noqualitative changes in our results.
10Thisresult is consistent with otherempiricalstudiesofthe impact of licensing statutesoneconomic
variables(Pashigian1980; Kleiner. Gay and Greene 1982;andKlelner 1990).
10licensing pass rates." We also checked for selectivity at time of enrollment by
estimating the relationship between the number of applicants to dental school per
enrollee lagged by three years, on the state pass rate. We found no significant results,
(i.e., results had t-ratios of 1.00 or lower when the estimates are controlled by year).
The coefficient estimates for the pass rates in Table 4 show a positive and
generally significant impact. In all our specifications for data gathered on enrollees or
new dentists, the pass rate is positively associated with larger numbers of potential or
new dentists in the state. For example, a one percent increase in the pass rate is
associated with an increase in the number of new dental enrollees that plan to practice in
the state using data over the period 1970 to 1984 of between .19 and .32 percent
depending on the specification employed.
The results presented in Table 4 suggest that models of entry into state-licensed
professions, such as dentistry, suffer from potential omitted variable bias if the role of
state occupational regulation is not explicitly considered. Further, our results are robust;
they show that pass rates on state administered exams have a significant influence in
alternative specifications employing different data sets (i.e., the number of dental school
entrants from the state and the number of new dentists to the state). In occupations
where the state or its designees have significant control over the content of licensing
exams and the scores required to pass them, this factor is an important variable that
should be included in estimates of models of occupational choice and entry.
The selectivity adjustment was estimated in a manner consistent with the 'a method' developedby
Murnane, Olson, and Newstad (1985). The value for the predicted number of individuals taking the exam was
added to adjust for potential selectivity bias in the enrollment and new dentist equations.
11CONCLUSIONS
This study has examined the impact of the stringency of occupational licensing
provisions on the occupational entry of dentists. Developing and testing a cobweb model
of occupational entry into dentistry without licensing related variables for occupational
entry, we find that the model works reasonably well at both the national and state levels.
We then introduce the role of state occupational licensing as a potential omitted variable.
In a national time series model we find that licensing as measured by the pass rate is
positive and usually statistically significant. Furthermore, at the state level in pooled
cross section-time series models, we find that more restrictive licensing of dentists, as
measured through the occupational pass rate, is positive and irs most cases significant in
influencing the number of new entrants and graduates of dental school programs. Our
results suggest that economists who examine occupational entry in licensed occupations
may have omitted variable bias by failing to include measures of occupational regulation.
Further, this study adds to the evidence that state occupational licensing continues to
have important labor market consequences for both practitioners and the public.
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National Cobweb Estimates for Dental Enrollees (1960—84)
and Graduates (1960—84)
Enrollees Graduates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Salaryof .12 .04 .13 .11 .46 .36
New Dentists (.08) (.07) (.10) (.11) (.09) (.06)
Salary of —.24 .00 —.24 —.16 —.68 —.41
New College Grads (.19) (.15) (.23) (.25) (.20) (.13)
Pass Rate .56 .21 .61
(.14) (.29) (.17)
Lagged EndogeflOUS .94 1.04 .99 1.04
Variable (.04) (.04) (.05) (.08)
Lagged Enrollment 1.11 1.22
(.05) (.03)
Intercept 1.59 —3.19 1.09 —.76 .89—4.39
(1.48) (1.65) (1.73) (3.15)(1.64)(1.62)
R2 .96 .98 .96 .96 .98 .98
D.W. 2.78 2.74 2.26 2.56 2.15 2.24
Standard Errors are in parentheses
All variables in logarithmic formTable 3
State Cobweb Model Estimates for New Dentists (1960—1984)
and Enrollee (1970—1984) Rates*
New Dentists Enrollees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State Salary .29 .02 .04 .09 .13 .15 .11 .22
of Dentists (.04)(.04) (.07)(.10) (.07)(.09)(.08)(.12)
Average Earnings —.04 —.20 —.03 .12 —.07—.11—.13—.49
in State (.04)(.06) (.04)(.07) (.07)(.15)(.07)(.22)
National Salary of .49 .40 .57—.06
Dentists (.11)(.13) (.30)(.20)
National Salary of —.42 —.98 .17 .25
New College Grads (.36)(.11) (.36) (.35)
Intercept —3.71 —3.08 —.21 —8.68
(.51) (2.20) (1.08) (4.90)
Year X X X X X X X X
State Fixed Effects X X X X
Lagged Endogenous X X X X X X X X
Variable
.96 .96 .98 .97
Standard Errors are in parentheses
All variables in logarithmic form
*Allestimates use Newey-West corrections for heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelatjon and Hausman tests.Table 4
State cobweb Estimates for New Dentists end Enrollee Rates
with Varying Licensing Provisions, 197l_l984*
New Dentists Enrollees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 21.56 25.25 —26.79 113.22
(13.98) (83.96) (20.47) (71.97)
State Salary .14 .09 .39 .13 .29 .36
of Dentists (.07) (.09) (.19) (.10) (.15) (.16)
Average Earnings .05 —.15 .09 .00 —.59 —.20
in State (.05) (.16) (.12) (.07) (.25) (.12)
State Pass Rate .09 .46 .46 .26 .19 .32
(.06) (.08) (.18) (.10) (.12) (.16)
Provision for .003 —.02
citizenship (.020) (.02)
Time Since Statute .01 —.002
Was changed (.02) (.002)
With controls For:
Year X X X X X
State Fixed Effects X X
Selection Adjustment X X X X X X
for Number Taking
the Exam
Lagged Endogenous X X X X X X
variable
National Salary of X X DC DC DC DC
Dentists
National Earnings of DC DC DC DC DC DC
New college Grads
.99 .99 .99 .99
Standard Errors are in parentheses. All variables in logarithmic form.
*Estimatesfor columns (3) and (6) include only 1971—78. All estimates use
Newey—West corrections for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and
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